We outline eight characteristics of the environments, tasks, and agents important for human-level intelligence. Treating these characteristics as influences on desired agent behavior, we then derive twelve requirements for general cognitive architectures. Cognitive-architecture designs that meet the requirements should support human-level behavior across a wide range of tasks, embedded in environment similar to the real world. Although requirements introduced here are hypothesized as necessary ones for human-level intelligence, our assumption is the list is not yet sufficient to guarantee the achievement of human-level intelligence when met. However, attempts to be explicit about influences and specific requirements may be more productive than direct comparison of architectural designs and features for communication and interaction about cognitive architectures.
Introduction
This paper explores requirements on cognitive architectures for artificial general intelligence. The goal of the analysis is to determine the requirements for cognitive architectures that support the full-range of human-level intelligent behavior. Although many different architectures have been proposed (and some built), understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses of these architectures and their unique contributions to the pursuit of humanlevel intelligence has proven elusive, whether via analytic comparison (e.g., Anderson & Lebiere, 2003; Jones and Wray, 2006) or empirical comparisons on task performance (e.g., Gluck & Pew. 2005) .
However, as suggested by Cohen (1995) , three influences determine an agent's behavior: the agent's structure, its environment, and tasks. 1 Given the diversity of environments and tasks, we are not attempting to create architectures that are necessarily the best or even sufficient for all possible environments and all possible tasks. We assume that agents exist in an environment and pursue tasks similar to those we find in the world we inhabit. The challenge is to take advantage of the structure of the environment and tasks in our architecture design, while avoiding optimizations that apply to only a subset of tasks. For specific problems, specialized architectures can be more appropriate (e.g., Deep Blue for chess, Campbell, Hoane & Hsu 2002) . Figure 1 illustrates how the characteristics of the environment, tasks, and agent structure determine a set of requirements for a cognitive architecture. These requirements in turn are the basis for a specific architecture design. Cognitive architectures must provide a comprehensive computational story that puts all the pieces of intelligence together from end to end. In practice, researchers have typically focused on communicating the architectural design of their systems and its performance on specific tasks rather than motivating the design via specific requirements. We propose to orient future discussion around requirements rather than specific designs. There will be two immediate benefits to this approach. First, it makes little sense to compare architectures (as works in progress) when they share few requirements. If one architecture attempts to satisfy a requirement that all decisions must be made in bounded time, whereas another is developed independent of that requirement, we would expect to see very different approaches that would be difficult, if not meaningless to compare. Being explicit about requirements will make it easier to see what "spaces" architectures are attempting to occupy -what environments and problems they are appropriate for. Secondly, because human-level intelligence is so broad, there is no existing list of necessary and sufficient requirements of AGI. This paper, drawing from our experience, proposes an initial list of these requirements. We expect it to be refined, extended, and corrected via interaction with other researchers.
We recognize this attempt is not novel. John Anderson took a step in this direction with the design of specific components of ACT-R using a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990) . He determined optimal methods for primitive architectural functions, such as retrieving an item from declarative memory given the expected use of that memory in the future. This revolutionized his design process and led to significant advances in ACT, including the development of a new process for retrieving items from long-term declarative memory. Although rational analysis is useful for designing the performance of specific components, it is difficult to apply to the specification of a complete cognitive architecture as it does not specify what components there should be, or how they combine together to provide general intelligent behavior.
The analysis also builds on previous descriptions of evaluation criteria for cognitive architectures (Langley, Laird & Rogers, 2009; Laird et al. 2009; Laird et al., 1996; Laird, 1991) and theories of cognition (Anderson & Lebiere, 2003; Newell, 1990) . For example, previously identified criteria include a mixture of constraints on behavior (flexible behavior, real-time performance) architecture (support vast knowledge bases), and underlying technology (brain realization) (Newell, 1990 , Anderson & Lebiere, 2003 . We separate characteristics of the environment, tasks, agent structure, and the behavior of an agent, which are described below, and then use them to derive requirements for cognitive architectures.
Environment, Task, and Agent Characteristics
In this section, we list characteristics of environments, tasks, and agents that lead to requirements for architectures that support human-level intelligent agents. Some of these characteristics are obvious, or so ingrained in the literature that they are rarely made explicit, such as the existence of regularities at different time scales in the environment. Some of these are characteristics of one of the three components, independent of the others, but many of them are characteristics of interactions between two or even all three. The interactions are important because the characteristics of an environment are only important to the extent they influence the agent's ability to pursue its tasks.
C1. ENVIRONMENT IS COMPLEX WITH DIVERSE INTERACTING OBJECTS
The world is large and complex. Agents can usefully interpret the environment as if it consists of independent objects (together with materials that do not have object-like structure, such as air, water, and sand). There are many objects and the objects interact with each other (i.e., via physics). Objects have numerous diverse properties.
C2. ENVIRONMENT IS DYNAMIC
The agent's environment can change independently of the agent so that the agent does not determine the state of the environment and the agent must respond to the dynamics of the world. Because the world can change while an agent is reasoning, an agent must be able to respond quickly relative to the dynamics of the environment. Moreover, the dynamics of the environment are so complex that an agent cannot always accurately predict future states in detail.
C3. TASK-RELEVANT REGULARITIES EXIST
AT MULTIPLE TIME SCALES An environment, while it may be complex and dynamic, it is not arbitrary. The environment is governed by laws of interaction that are constant, often predictable, and lead to recurrence and regularity that impact the agent's ability to achieve goals. Regularities exist at a variety of time scales.
C4. OTHER AGENTS IMPACT TASK PERFORMANCE
The agent is not alone, and must interact with other agents in pursuit of its goals. Other agents may help or hinder the agent's achievement of its tasks. The agent can communicate with the other agents to share knowledge, indicate intent, etc. In addition, some agents have similar structure and capabilities to the agent (similar perception, action, and mental capabilities), making it possible to learn from other agents by observing the methods they use for solving problems. This characteristic is a special case of C1, C2, and C3, but has sufficient impact on the structure of agents to warrant distinct enumeration.
C5. TASKS CAN BE COMPLEX, DIVERSE, AND NOVEL
A general, intelligent agent must be able to work on a diverse set of novel, complex tasks. Tasks can interact so that in some cases, achieving one task aids in achieving another, while in other cases, achieving one makes it more difficult to achieve another. Tasks can also vary in the time scales required to achieve them, where the agent must achieve some tasks at close to the timescale of relevant changes in the environment, while others tasks can require extended behavior over time.
C6. AGENT/ENVIRONMENT/TASK INTERACTIONS ARE COMPLEX AND LIMITED
There may be many regularities in the environment, but they are only relevant if they can be detected and influence the agent's ability to perform its tasks. Thus, an agent has sufficient sensory capabilities that it can detect (possibly only through extensive learning) task-relevant regularities in the environment. An agent also has many mechanisms for acting in the environment in order to pursue a task. Although sensing and action modalities can be extensive, they are limited. The environment is partially observable, both from inherent physical limits in the sensors and the size of the environment. Sensors have noise and can be occluded by objects, have limited range, etc. making the agent's perception of its environment incomplete and uncertain. The agent's actions must obey the physical limitations of the environment. For example, actions usually take time to execute and have limited extent.
C7. AGENT COMPUTATIONAL RESOURCES ARE LIMITED
The agent has physical limits on its computational resources relative to the dynamics of the environment. The agent is unable to perform arbitrary computation in the time it has available to respond to the environment. Thus, an agent has bounded rationality (Simon, 1969) and cannot achieve perfect rationality (or universal intelligence, Legg & Hutter, 2007) in sufficiently complex environments and tasks when it has large bodies of knowledge.
C8. AGENT EXISTENCE IS LONG-TERM AND CONTINUAL
The agent is always present in its environment and it needs to actively pursue core tasks (such as self-protection) related to its survival. The agent may act to position itself so that the dynamics of the environment have little impact on it for extended times (e.g., hide in a protected area), but it has no guarantee that those efforts will be successful. Further, the agent has a long-term existence relative to its primitive interactions with its environment. Its activity extends indefinitely across multiple tasks, and possibly multiple instances of the same task.
Architectural Requirements
Based on the characteristics of environments, tasks, and agents presented in the previous section, we derive the following requirements for cognitive architectures related to knowledge acquisition, representation, and use. Our goal is to generate a list that is necessary, such that all humanlevel agents must meet these requirements and that it is sufficient, such that meeting these requirement guarantees human-level behavior. The requirements we derive do not include criteria related to how well they model human behavior, nor the ease with which humans can create, debug, maintain, or extend agents developed in cognitive architectures. We also have not included criteria related to properties of the theory underlying the architecture, such as parsimony (Cassimatis, Bello, & Langley, 2008) .
R0. FIXED STRUCTURE FOR ALL TASKS
An individual agent adapts to its environment not through changes in its architecture but through changes in knowledge. Architectures should not depend on parameters that are tuned to improve performance on a new task; although parameters can be useful for introducing variation across agents. Architectures also should not allow escape to a programming language for task-specific extensions. The rationale for this requirement is that environmental regularities exist [C3] at time scales that approach or exceed the life of the agent [C8] that are worth capturing in a fixed architecture.
R1. REALIZE A SYMBOL SYSTEM
The consensus in AI and cognitive science is that in order to achieve human-level behavior, a system must support universal computation. Newell (1990) makes the case that symbol systems provide both sufficient and necessary means for achieving universal computation; that is, a symbol system is capable of producing a response for every computable function. Possibly most important, symbol systems provide flexibility. In particular, they provide the ability to manipulate a description of some object in the world "in the head" without having to manipulate the object in the real world. Symbol structures also provide arbitrary composability to match the combinatoric complexity and regularity of the environment [C1, C3]. Thus, structures encountered independently can be combined later to create novel structures never experienced together [C5] . This generative capability is what we do when we combine letters or sounds to make new words, and when we combine words to make new sentences, and so on. Symbol systems also allow us to accept instructions from another agent and then use those instructions later to influence behavior (interpretation) -providing additional flexibility and more generality -so that not everything must be programmed into a symbol system beforehand. In addition, symbols are required for communication that does not cause the meaning to be directly experienced by the agent [C4]. For example, striking someone directly causes an experience in another agent, while a verbal threat involves the transmission of symbols that require interpretation.
Requiring that the agent realize a symbol system does not imply that symbolic processing must be implemented directly via some symbolic knowledge representation.
Neural and connectionist models can obviously support human-level behavior. Rather, this requirement posits that such approaches must implement symbol systems to some degree (Barsalou, 2005) .
R2. REPRESENT AND EFFECTIVELY USE MODALITY-SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Although pure symbol systems support universal computation, they rely on modality-independent methods for representing and reasoning to achieve universality and complete composability. However, complete composability is not always necessary. . Moreover, at the other extreme, when there are sufficient computational resources available relative to the dynamics of the environment and task, the agent should have the ability to compose novel responses based on its knowledge that takes advantage of regularities in the tasks and environment [C3] . This composition is the basis for planning and it takes time, but allows the agent to integrate its diverse and potentially large bodies of knowledge for novel situations [R1-R8] . In between these two extremes, the agent must balance the tradeoff between deliberation and reaction based on its knowledge of the situation. , some of which can be extracted from a single situation in which all of the information is available at the same time, whereas in others; the information may be spread across time. Although general learning mechanisms exist, they are invariably biased toward specific types of knowledge that are available to the agent in different ways and often at different time scales. Moreover, a general cognitive architecture should be able to learn all the types of task-specific knowledge it represents and uses, a property we call the learning completeness principle. A significant component of our own research is to explore what types of knowledge different learning mechanisms can contribute to achieving learning completeness. when they are available. Once the experience has happened, it is gone. Only the information that the agent itself stores while it is behaving is available to guide its future behavior. This is not to suggest that an agent cannot recall prior situations and perform additional analysis at some future time [R6]; however, some primitive learning mechanism must store away the experience for that future, more deliberative learning. Moreover, the mechanisms for storing and retrieving those experiences must scale as more and more experiences are captured. Incremental learning incorporates experiences when they are experienced.
R10. SUPPORT DIVERSE, COMPREHENSIVE LEARNING

R11. SUPPORT INCREMENTAL, ONLINE LEARNING
One implication of this requirement (together with the need for large bodies of knowledge) is that new knowledge must be acquired at low, bounded computational cost in real time; learning should not disrupt the agent's ongoing behavior by significantly slowing overall processing and negatively impacting its ability to react to its environment.
Summary
In this paper, we outlined characteristics of the environments, tasks, and agents important for human-level intelligence and, from these characteristics, derived requirements for general cognitive architectures. Architectural designs following from meeting the requirements should support human-level behavior across a wide range of tasks, embedded in environment similar to the real world. Figure 2 summarizes the analysis described above. The figure highlights the dense connectivity between characteristics and requirements -no single characteristic is solely responsible for any requirement and no characteristic influences only a single requirement. 
Discussion & Conclusion
The requirements we derived (R0-R11) define a rough design envelope for underlying architectures. However, the role of knowledge in agent development complicates attempts to match the achievement of specific requirements with specific architectural components. Behavior in an agent is the result of the interaction between knowledge and architecture; some requirements may be achieved through general knowledge combined with multiple architectural components. For example, many cognitive architectures do not have explicit architectural support for planning. Not including such architectural support simplifies these architectures, but requires encoding of knowledge representation(s) and algorithms for planning using architectural primitives. Achieving a requirement directly with the architecture allows for a more efficient implementation. Achieving a requirement in knowledge usually leads to a simpler architecture while providing more flexibility and the possibility of improving the capability through learning. This tension is analogous to Our own hypothesis is that significant bodies of knowledge in combination with the architecture are required for many of the cognitive capabilities needed to achieve human-level performance. Examples include natural language processing, logical thinking, qualitative reasoning, and multi-agent coordination. However, the requirements listed above do not address what knowledge is necessary to support such capabilities, or how that knowledge is acquired and encoded. Thus, even if we create architectures that satisfy all of the listed requirements, we will still fall short of creating human-level agents until we encode, or the systems learn on their own, the content required for higher-level knowledge-intensive capabilities.
Even when we restrict ourselves to considering the requirements within the context of cognitive architecture independent of knowledge, it is difficult to evaluate the sufficiency of these requirements by examination alone. Many of the requirements are qualitative and vague, making them difficult to apply to existing architectures. For example, how do we judge whether an architecture supports sufficient levels of generality in its knowledge representations, or sufficient representations of metacognitive knowledge, or sufficiently comprehensive learning mechanisms? Thus, an important goal for future research in human-level agents is to refine these requirements as we learn more about the capabilities that are necessary for human-level behavior.
The current list or requirements emphasizes necessity and may be missing some yet to be discovered requirements that are needed to guarantee human-level behavior. These requirements may arise from interactions among the existing characteristics (C1-C8) or they may arise because of the existence of yet additional characteristics of agents, tasks, and environments that are relevant to achieving human-level intelligence.
Our own hypothesis is that one of the best ways to refine and extend these sets of requirements and characteristics is to develop agents using cognitive architectures that test the sufficiency and necessity of all these and other possible characteristics and requirements on a variety of real-world tasks. One challenge is to find tasks and environments where all of these characteristics are active, and thus all of the requirements must be confronted. A second challenge is that the existence of an architecture that achieves a subset of these requirements, does not guarantee that such an architecture can be extended to achieve other requirements while maintaining satisfaction of the original set of requirements. Usually there are too many potential interactions between architectural components to guarantee such an incremental approach. It is for these reasons that our own research is inspired by studies of human psychology. We know that the human cognitive architecture is sufficient for generating the behavior we seek from our agents, and if we build systems that capture the core functionality of components of the human architecture, it is more likely that we will avoid dead ends in cognitive architecture development. Independent of what approach is used to develop a cognitive architecture, we propose that exploring how different architectures address (or do not address) these requirements, both theoretically and empirically, is our best chance to advance our knowledge of how cognitive architecture can support human-level intelligence.
